

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA**

**CLIFTON E. MCLEAN,**

**Petitioner,**

**v.**

**CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:07cv83  
(Judge Maxwell)**

**JOYCE FRANCIS, Warden,**

**Respondent.**

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

**I. BACKGROUND**

On October 18, 2007, the *pro se* petitioner filed an Application for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. The petitioner is an inmate at the Gilmer Federal Correctional Institution challenging the validity of a sentence imposed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. This matter is pending before me for an initial review and Report and Recommendation pursuant to LR PL P 83.09.

**II. FACTS**

The petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia following a plea of guilty to Wire Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. On September 23, 2005, the petitioner was sentenced to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to serve a term of 110 months imprisonment, three years supervised release and a \$100 Special Assessment. In addition, the petitioner was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$235,801.92 in payments of at least \$100 per month commencing within sixty days of his release. The petitioner did not appeal

his conviction and sentence, nor did he file a Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. §2255.<sup>1</sup> Petitioner attacks the validity of his sentence via a §2241 petition in which he asserts the following grounds for relief: (1) Claim of Actual Innocence; (2) Prosecutorial vindictiveness/retaliation; (3) Judicial Biased Judgment; (4) Miscarriage of Justice; and (5) [Violation of] Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment's (sic) of petitioner's constitutional rights. As relief, the petitioner seeks to have this Court lower the duration of his sentence "to the low end of the offense level 23/criminal History category VI, being that petitioner cooperated with authorities."

### **III. ANALYSIS**

A motion filed under §2241 is typically used to challenge the manner in which a sentence is executed. See In re Jones, 226 F.3d 338, 334 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1997). A motion filed pursuant to § 2255, on the other hand, is the primary means under which a federal prisoner may collaterally attack the legality of his conviction or sentence. See Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (collecting cases from other circuits). Here, the petitioner is challenging the legality of his sentence, but is time barred from raising the claim in a § 2255 petition.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Information regarding the petitioner's criminal conviction is available on PACER by accessing Case Number 1:05-cr-00254-GBL-1.

<sup>2</sup>In 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ["AEDPA"] was enacted, establishing a one-year limitation period within which to file any federal habeas corpus motion. 28 U.S.C. §2255.

The limitation period shall run from the last of:

1. The date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
- b. The date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
- c. The date on which the right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
- d. The date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have

However, despite the fact that a § 2255 petition is the proper vehicle for challenging a conviction or the imposition of a sentence, § 2241 may be used by a federal prisoner to challenge the legality of his conviction or sentence if he can satisfy the mandates of what is known as the Section 2255 “savings clause.” See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 901 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). The savings clause provides that a prisoner may file a writ of habeas corpus if a remedy through a § 2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective. See Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001); Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). It is well established that “in order to establish a remedy is ‘inadequate or ineffective’ under § 2255, there must be more than a procedural barrier to bringing a § 2255 petition.” Hill v. Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). Furthermore, § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the claim was previously raised in a § 2255 motion and denied, or because a remedy under the section is time-barred. United States v. Laurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000).

The Fourth Circuit has examined the prerequisites for finding that §2255 is an inadequate or ineffective remedy. In the case of In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit concluded that

§2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction when: (1) at the time of the conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first §2255 motion, the

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been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. §2255. Here, the petitioner’s conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired. Aikens v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000), The time for filing his direct appeal expired ten days after the written judgment of conviction was entered on the criminal docket. See Fed. R.Ap. P. 4(b)(A)(1), (6). Accordingly, the petitioner’s conviction became final on, or about October 12, 2005. Therefore, he had until October 13, 2006, to file a § 2255 petition.

substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gate-keeping provisions of §2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.<sup>3</sup>

Id. at 333-34.

Although the petitioner has not raised the savings clause, it is clear that he is not entitled to its application. In the instant case, even if the petitioner satisfied the first and the third elements of Jones, violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 remains a criminal offense, and therefore the petitioner cannot satisfy the second element of Jones. Therefore, the petitioner has not demonstrated that §2255 is an inadequate or ineffective remedy, and he has improperly filed a §2241 petition.

#### **IV. RECOMMENDATION**

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the petitioner's §2241 petition be **DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.**

Any party may file, within ten (10) days after being served with a copy of this Recommendation, with the Clerk of the Court, written objections identifying the portions of the Recommendation to which objections are made, and the basis for such objections. A copy of such objections should also be submitted to the Honorable Robert E. Maxwell, United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections to the Recommendation set forth above will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of this Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C.

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<sup>3</sup>The "gatekeeping" requirements provide that an individual may only file a second or successive §2255 motion if the claim sought to be raised presents:  
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or  
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.  
28 U.S.C. § 2255; see Jones, 226 F.3d at 330.

§ 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984).

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the *pro se* petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested, to his last known address as reflected on the docket sheet..

DATED: October 26, 2007

/s/ James E. Seibert  
JAMES E. SEIBERT  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE